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A CROSS IN THE ROAD: SALAZAR V BUONO AND
THE CIRCUIT DIVIDE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE REMEDIAL QUESTION
David Brewer+
Somewhere within 1.6 million acres of sand dunes and Joshua trees, among
the abandoned mines and the deserted homesteads, lies a rocky slope like any
other barren slope in the Mojave National Preserve. l This particular slope,
however, has become the unlikely setting for a Supreme Court showdown. 2 It
is now the center of a legal firestorm of constitutional proportions because of a
simple white cross, originally erected as a memorial to the fallen veterans of
World War I.3 Over seventy years later, the cross still stands, even as similar
crosses on other public lands have been removed for violating the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.4 The cross remains, despite the United States Court of Appeals
+ B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 2004; J.D. Candidate, May 2010, The Catholic
University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author wishes to thank his parents, Dean
and Nancy, for their limitless love and support; his brothers, Dean and Daniel, for their
inspiration and motivation; and his extended family for their encouragement. The author also
extends his deepest appreciation to his friends-in law school and out-for their timely humor
and welcome distractions, as well as to the editors and staff of the Catholic University Law
Review for their diligence, professionalism, and tireless work on this Comment.
1. See Mojave National Preserve, http://www.nps.gov/moja/index.htm (last visited Mar.
27, 2009).
2. See, e.g., David Ziemer, Establishment Clause Conflict Case: Cross Case Will Likely
Face U.S. Supreme Court Review, Wis. L. J., Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://www.wislaw
joumal.com/print.cfm?reclD=68694 (stating the case is "a strong candidate for review in the U.S.
Supreme Court"); Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
archives/archive_2007 09 02-2007 09 08.shtml#1189200966 (Sept. 7, 2007, 17:36) ("I just
read the Ninth Circuit's decision from yesterday in Buono v. Kempthorne, and it strikes me as
having a good chance of going up to the Supreme Court."); see also The9thCircuitWatch.com,
http://the9thcircuitwatch.com/blcomments.php?id=24 0_1_0-C (May 22, 2008, 15:35)
("Undoubtedly the government will seek review in the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit will
add another reversal to their voluminous record."). The United States filed a petition for writ of
certiorari on October 10, 2008. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kempthome v. Buono, No.
08-472 (Oct. 10, 2008). Certiorari was granted on February 23, 2009. Salazar v. Buono, 77
U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472).
3. ERIC CHARLES NYSTROM, FROM NEGLECTED SPACE TO PROTECTED PLACE: AN
ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF MOJAVE NATIONAL PRESERVE, ch. 6, at 6 (2003), available at
http://www.nps.gov/archive/moja/adminhist/adhi.htm. The most recent incarnation of the cross
consists of "eight feet of iron pipe welded to bolts sunk in holes drilled into the granite rock." Id.
4. See, e.g., Mendelson v. City of St. Cloud, 719 F. Supp. 1065, 1069, 1071 (M.D. Fla.
1989) (holding that a cross placed on a water tower was done so in violation of the Establishment
Clause); see also Separation of Church and State Comm. v. City of Eugene (SCSC), 93 F.3d 617,
618, 620 (9th Cir. 1996). Decided a decade before Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.
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for the Ninth Circuit's finding that its location violates the Establishment
Clause, 5 because one more wrinkle in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
needs to be ironed out among the circuit courts.6 This cross, all alone in the
middle of the California desert, represents a novel issue in American
constitutional law: whether the government can effectively remedy an
Establishment Clause violation by transferring the offending land to a private
party.
7
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from
making any law concerning the establishment of a religion. 8 Since its adoption
in 1791, the Clause has been interpreted and reinterpreted to gradually narrow
the scope of permissible government involvement in religion.9  The robust
attention the Establishment Clause has received in the courts, however, has
failed to leave a clear blueprint of what constitutes an Establishment Clause
violation.'0  Not surprisingly, courts have been inconsistent about the next
step-how the government can cure an Establishment Clause violation once it
has occurred.1' Here, the lonely cross atop the isolated rocky slope in the
Mojave Desert plays a significant role.
2008), SCSC was a Ninth Circuit case in which the court held that the city of Eugene, Oregon
violated the Establishment Clause by maintaining a Latin cross as a war memorial. SCSC, 93
F.3d at 620. The cross at issue in SCSC was eventually moved to private property on the campus
of the Eugene Bible College, but only after police negotiators ended a three-hour siege initiated
by an armed supporter of the cross. See Dana Tims, Workers Remove Cross from Atop Eugene's
Skinner Butte, THE OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), June 13, 1997, at Al.
5. Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
6. See discussion infra Part I.B.
7. See discussion infra Parts 11-111.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause is paired with the Free Exercise
Clause, which prohibits Congress from restricting the free exercise of religion. Id.
9. See Stuart Buck, The Nineteenth-Century Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 6
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399, 400 (2002) (explaining that the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has "radical[ly] depart[ed]" from the original text to "the current doctrinal model
[that] sets up a heckler's veto, allowing federal courts to intervene whenever some citizen is
displeased over even the slightest governmental benefit, accommodation, or approval for
religion").
10. See Patrick M. Garry, A Congressional Attempt to Alleviate the Uncertainty of the
Court's Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Public Expression of Religion Act, 37 CUMB.
L. REv. 1, 2 (2006-2007) ("[T]he courts have not only used an array of different constitutional
tests for determining Establishment Clause violations, but have applied those tests in confusing
and inconsistent ways."). Professor Garry argues that the non-uniform application of the
Establishment Clause has caused public officials to reject religious speech on public property
altogether. Id. at 3. As a result, Garry suggests that it has had a "chilling effect on the First
Amendment's freedoms of speech and religion." Id. at 5.
11. See Christopher Lauderman, Note, Building a Fence of Separation: The Constitutional
Validity of Land Transfers in Escaping from Establishment Clause Violations, 65 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1193, 1197-99 (2008) (summarizing the circuit split and noting it includes a split among
the branches of government as well). Compare Buono v. Kempthome (Buono V), 527 F.3d 758,
783 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23,
2009) (No. 08-472) ("Nor does the proposed land exchange ... end the improper government
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The story of the "Sunrise Rock" cross 12 begins with a grizzled old
prospector who lived in a shack "built out of wooden planks and corrugated
aluminum."' 3  In 1934, he and fellow members of the local Veterans of
Foreign Wars (VFW) chapter erected a steel pipe cross to serve as a memorial
to war veterans. 14 For decades, the cross went relatively unnoticed. 15 Not until
1994, when Congress declared the area to be a national preserve, under the
management of the National Park Service (NPS), did the status quo change.
16
Shortly thereafter, a former NPS employee, backed by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), sued to challenge the constitutionality of the cross.17
After the District Court for the Central District of California enjoined the
government from displaying the monument, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, rulinj
that the cross was an unconstitutional government endorsement of religion.'I
When Congress tried to remedy the violation by selling the land on which the
cross sat, the Ninth Circuit enjoined the government from making the
transfer. 19
Half a continent away, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit had already reached a different conclusion on the same question of
law. 20  In a pair of cases, it had allowed a municipality to remedy an
Establishment Clause violation by selling to a private entity the land on which
the religious display sat.21 Like the Sunrise Rock cross, the two religious
displays at issue stood uncontested for decades. 22 Legal challenges came only
after the Freedom from Religion Foundation requested that the municipalities
action. Such a transfer cannot be validly executed without running afoul of the injunction."), with
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005) ("This sale [of public
land] has clearly not pleased everyone, and it likely did not entirely please anyone. It was,
however, constitutionally appropriate.").
12. The site is known as "Sunrise Rock" because it has long been used by locals for annual
Easter sunrise services. NYSTROM, supra note 3, ch. 6, at 6.
13. Richard Lake, That OldRugged Cross, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec. 15, 2002, at lB.
14. See Richard Lake, Mojave Desert Cross Focus of Church-State Fight, PRESS-
TELEGRAM (Long Beach, Ca.), Dec. 25, 2002, at A7; Lake, supra note 13.
15. Occasionally, vandals or the weather would destroy the cross, but the cross was always
repaired or replaced. See Lake, supra note 13.
16. See California Desert Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-433, § 502, 108 Stat. 71,
4490 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-42 (2000)). This Act created the Mojave National Preserve
and transferred the land, which was already federal property, from the Bureau of Land
Management to the National Park Service. Id §§ 502-03.
17. See Opposition Brief of Appellees at 4, Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2003)
(No. 03-55032); NYSTROM, supra note 3, ch. 6, at 6-7.
18. See Buono v. Norton (Buono 11), 371 F.3d 543, 545, 550 (9th Cir. 2004).
19. See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007), amended
by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3242
(U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472).
20. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005); Freedom
from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000).
21. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 705; Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 493.
22. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 696; see Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489.
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remove the displays from public property. 23  Rather than removing the
displays, however, the municipalities sold the land to private parties.24 In the
ensuing litigation, the Seventh Circuit determined that the sale of land
effectively remedied the Establishment Clause violation absent "unusual
circumstances" and allowed the sales to proceed.25
The divergent holdings of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits call attention to
the different doctrines used by the courts in their respective analyses. Some
methods of analysis, such as the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the
reasonable observer standard, are commonplace in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. 26  Other methods of analysis, including the "unusual
circumstances" doctrine employed by the Seventh Circuit, are not as oft-
27used. Additional doctrines, namely the public function doctrine and the
notion of deference to government actions, are more common to other areas of
jurisprudence. 28 The interplay of these doctrines, their varying uses, and their
misuses helps to shed light on exactly how the circuits split.
29
This Comment examines and analyzes the split between the Ninth and
Seventh Circuits. Part I.A. reviews the Supreme Court's current Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, starting with its modem origins in Lemon v. Kurtzman
and continuing to its recent disjointed application. Part I.B. then addresses the
inconsistent Establishment Clause remedial analysis that flows from the
Court's cacophonous broader jurisprudence. It does so by examining the
substantive issues surrounding the split between Salazar v. Buono from the
Ninth Circuit and Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of
Marshfield and Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles in the Seventh Circuit.
Next, Part II employs the issues to critique the weaknesses of the Ninth
Circuit's holding in light of the Seventh Circuit's strengths. Here, this
Comment focuses on the scope of the "unusual circumstances" doctrine, the
Supreme Court's public function jurisprudence, the notion of deference to
governments, and the reasonable observer standard. Finally, Part III examines
other remedial options, and then concludes by encouraging the Court to bring
clarity, flexibility, and fairness to its ever-evolving Establishment Clause
jurisprudence by adopting a presumption of effectiveness to remedial land
transfers.
23. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 696; Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489.
24. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 697; Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 490.
25. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 700-01; Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491.
26. See discussion infra Part I.A. 1.
27. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491 (adopting the "unusual circumstances" doctrine).
28. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (explaining the notion of deference to government actions); Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (finding a public function in the maintenance of a private
park).
29. See discussion infra Part II.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: A DISJOINTED DOCTRINE
A. The Development of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
For over two hundred years, the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution has commanded that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion." 30 Despite its longevity, perhaps no other area of
American law has had as much inconsistency and dissonance as Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 31 Prior to the mid-twentieth century, an Establishment
Clause violation involved only those characteristics that were part of the
Anglicanism rejected by the founders. 32  These characteristics were: "(1)
institutional mingling between government and religion, (2) direct government
support for a particular religion, (3) special privileges for a particular religion,
or (4) coercion of religious belief, including the punishment of non-
adherents." 33  In the last half century, however, and indeed since 1971, the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this area has departed from this simple
standard to become increasingly complex and disjointed.34
1. The Lemon Test and its Progeny
In deciding Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971, the Supreme Court adopted a new
three-part test for Establishment Clause violations. 35 Under this test, there is
no violation if the government action (1) has a secular legislative purpose, (2)
does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3)
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment became effective on December 15, 1791
with its ratification by the state of Virginia. JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 72 (2000). James Madison,
the principle architect of the Bill of Rights, declared that, "he apprehended the meaning of [the
First Amendment] to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their
conscience." I ANNALS OF CONG. 730 (1789). Scholars have recognized Madison's statement as
the authority on the meaning of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell,
Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 937 (1986)
(asserting that "Madison's statements on the floor of Congress are of the greatest weight" in
interpreting the First Amendment).
31. See Buck, supra note 9, at 410-11; Jason Marques, Note, To Bear a Cross: The
Establishment Clause, Historic Preservation, and Eminent Domain Intersect at the Mt. Soledad
Veterans Memorial, 59 FLA. L. REV. 829, 843-44 (2007).
32. Buck, supra note 9, at 400.
33. Id.
34. Arguably, this fractured treatment of the Establishment Clause originated with the
Court's decision in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). See Marques, supra note
31, at 843-44. In that case, the Court invoked Thomas Jefferson's notion of a "separation
between church and State" in reviewing a New Jersey law that allowed the state to reimburse
parents for transportation to parochial schools. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18. Interestingly, many
historians and commentators have suggested that the Court in Everson misapplied Jefferson's
metaphor. See PATRICK M. GARRY, WRESTLING WITH GOD: THE COURT'S TORTUOUS
TREATMENT OF RELIGION 48-52 (2006).
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.36  Since then,
however, the Lemon test has inspired little affection and even less
confidence. 37 The Court's attempts at improving upon Lemon have left the
Establishment Clause with almost as many interpretations as there are Supreme
Court justices.38  Although Lemon has never been explicitly overruled,39 the
Court has come to accept Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test" as the
preferred Establishment Clause test.40 This test requires the Court to determine
36. Id.
37. See Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REv. 463, 468-69. Professor Gey argues:
The almost uniform use of Lemon gives a misleading appearance of coherence and
consistency in the application of this standard. In reality, the Court's application of
Lemon has been erratic, contradictory, and arguably irrational. Although measuring
such things scientifically is impossible, the three-part test for compliance with the
Establishment Clause announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman is probably the most maligned
constitutional standard the Court has ever produced.
Id. at 468 (footnote omitted). Another commentator has declared the test to be "so unsatisfactory
that hardly anyone, either on the Court or in academia, supports it." Buck, supra note 9, at 410.
Justice Scalia has also voiced his displeasure with Lemon's continued use, calling it a "ghoul in a
late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried ...." Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
38. For instance, Justice O'Connor attempted to improve on Lemon by "[flocusing on
institutional entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of religion." Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist read the Court's
precedents to suggest a neutrality approach toward the Establishment Clause that
make[s] clear that where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion,
and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and
independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the
Establishment Clause.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 647, 652, 662-63 (2002) (holding that a school
voucher program in which eighty-two percent of the participating schools had a religious
affiliation and ninety-six percent of participating students attended a religiously affiliated school
did not violate the Establishment Clause). Contrarily, Justice Kennedy proclaimed a different
approach to the Establishment Clause, one that protected "th[e] sphere of inviolable conscience
and belief." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592, 599 (1992) (holding that an invocation and
benediction during a public school's graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause). As
a result of these differing interpretations, the Court came to some seemingly contradictory
conclusions, such as allowing a creche in a municipal shopping district, but disallowing a creche
in a municipal courthouse. Compare Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687, with County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601-02 (1989).
39. One commentator theorizes that "the Court continues to apply the [Lemon] test,
presumably because no one has been able to conceive of a better alternative that could command
five votes." Buck, supra note 9, at 410.
40. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (applying the endorsement test to determine that the
display of a creche in a county courthouse violates the Establishment Clause); see also GARRY,
supra note 34, at 57 ("[The endorsement] test has become the Supreme Court's preeminent means
for analyzing the constitutionality of religious symbols and expression on public property .... ).
Justice Kennedy, however, refused to accept the endorsement test, calling it "flawed in its
[Vol. 58:813
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only whether the challenged government action "has the effect of endorsing [or
disapproving] religious beliefs. Although seen as an improvement on
Lemon, the endorsement test suffers from the same ailments that plagued the
Lemon test.42 Two 2005 cases, both decided the same day, presented the Court
with a unique opportunity to refine and clarify its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.43
2. Van Orden v. Perry
The Supreme Court heard arguments in Van Orden v. Perry to determine
whether the Establishment Clause prohibited "the display of a monument
inscribed with the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds.
' '44
In a plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist took note of the Court's varied
use of the Lemon test in Establishment Clause cases.45  Yet he declined to
make a conclusive determination on the fate of the Lemon test and instead
focused on the nature of the monument in a historical context.4 6  After
providing a brief history of the role of religion in American life, the Chief
Justice went on to emphasize the Ten Commandments' legal and historical
fundamentals and unworkable in practice." Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). He criticized the test for its inconsistency and labeled it a
"jurisprudence of minutiae" that would prove difficult to apply. Id. at 674-75. He noted that the
test itself, by employing a reasonable observer to determine whether a religious message is
unconstitutional, necessarily delved too far into religion. Id. at 677. As he explained,
the very nature of the endorsement test, with its emphasis on the feelings of the
objective observer, easily lends itself to this type of [religious] inquiry. If there be such
a person as the "reasonable observer," I am quite certain that he or she will take away a
salient message from our holding in these cases: the Supreme Court of the United
States has concluded that the First Amendment creates classes of religions based on the
relative numbers of their adherents.
Id.
41. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (majority opinion); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
42. See Garry, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that the endorsement test is "fraught with
uncertainty"); see also GARRY, supra note 34, at 59 (explaining that the endorsement test's
inherent subjectivity in "call[ing] for judges to speculate about the impressions that unknown
people may have received from various religious speech or symbols" prevents the test from
achieving any degree of certainty).
43. See Marques, supra note 31, at 849-50.
44. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005). The grounds of the Texas State Capitol
contained numerous monuments celebrating the Texan identity, including the six-foot tall
monolith at issue. Id. In addition to the Ten Commandments, the monolith displayed an eagle
grasping an American flag, two Stars of David, an eye inside of a pyramid, and the Greek letters
Chi and Rho. Id.
45. Id. at 685-86 (citing various cases in which the Court applied Lemon, did not apply
Lemon, used Lemon's factors only as "helpful signposts," and applied Lemon only after finding a
violation under another Establishment Clause test).
46. Id. at 686. The Chief Justice proclaimed that the Lemon test was not useful for the "sort
of passive monument" that Texas had erected on its state capitol grounds. Id
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significance.47 The Chief Justice concluded that the display, as a passive
historical monument, was constitutional because its setting and location
conveyed an overall secular meaning. 4 In so holding, however, the Court
missed a valuable opportunity to elucidate its Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, a fact further illuminated by the contemporaneous holding in
McCreary County v. ACLU.
49
3. McCreary County v. ACLU
In McCreary County v. ACLU, the Supreme Court was again presented with
the question of whether the Establishment Clause prohibited the display of the
Ten Commandments, this time in courthouses in two Kentucky counties.
50
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, held fast to the Lemon test.5' He
interpreted the Lemon test's purpose prong to require a genuine purpose that is
"not a sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective. 52  In
reviewing the counties' ever-shifting proffered purposes for the displays,53 the
Court concluded that the counties failed to meet this standard.54 Accordingly,
the Court found a violation of the Establishment Clause and enjoined the
display of the Ten Commandments.
55
Presented with an opportunity to unify its approach to the Establishment
Clause, the contrasting holdings in Van Orden and McCreary County only
47. Id. at 689-90.
48. Id. at 691-92 ("The inclusion of the Ten Commandments monument in this group has a
dual significance, partaking of both religion and government. We cannot say that Texas' display
of this monument violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.").
49. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
50. Id. at 850. McCreary and Pulaski Counties had displayed large, gold-framed copies of
the King James Version of the Ten Commandments. Id. at 851. In response to the ACLU's
lawsuit, the counties added eight other documents to the display, including the Preamble to the
Kentucky Constitution, the national motto of "In God We Trust," and the Mayflower Compact.
Id. at 853-54. After the district court issued a preliminary injunction against the displays, the
counties posted a new display in each courthouse consisting of nine framed documents and
entitled "The Foundations of American Law and Government Display." Id. at 854-56.
51. Id. at 861 ("[T]he Counties ask us to abandon Lemon's purpose test, or at least to
truncate any enquiry into purpose here. . . . The assertions are as seismic as they are
unconvincing.").
52. Id. at 864.
53. See id. at 852-53, 856-57. The counties' proffered reason for the first two versions was
to display the "precedent legal code upon which the civil and criminal codes of... Kentucky
[were] founded." Id. at 853 (omission in original). The counties argued the third version was
meant "to demonstrate that the Ten Commandments were part of the foundation of American law
and Government" and to educate the counties' citizens as to "some of the documents that played a
significant role in the foundation of our system of law and government." Id. at 856-57.
54. Id. at 870 ("[T]he Counties make no attempt to defend their undeniable objective, but
instead hopefully describe version two [of the display] as 'dead and buried."' (citation omitted)).
55. Id. at 881.
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further highlight the discord in the Court's jurisprudence. 56  Although
originally intended to prohibit a narrow class of improper government
interaction with religion, by the turn of the millennium Establishment Clause
jurisprudence had grown to prohibit almost all government action involving
religion.57 In the process, the Establishment Clause had developed an eclectic
and unpredictable reputation.
58
B. The Circuit Divide on the Establishment Clause Remedial Analysis
In line with the Supreme Court's inconsistent Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, lower courts have had difficulty in articulating consistent
remedies for Establishment Clause violations. 59 The most common remedy for
a violation involving a religious display is a court-ordered removal of the
display from public property. Removal, however, has not been the only
remedy.61 Increasingly, governments are transferring land to private parties as
56. See Christopher B. Harwood, Evaluating the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
Jurisprudence in the Wake of Van Orden v. Perry and McCreary County v. ACLU, 71 MO. L.
REV. 317, 337-38 (2006) (discussing competing principles employed by the Court in deciding
these cases). The plurality in Van Orden utilized the accommodation principle, under which
government policies acknowledging or supporting religion in society are compatible with the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 341-42. The competing principle, asserted by the majority in
McCreary County, was the neutrality principle, under which the government "must not favor one
religion over another, religion over secularism, or secularism over religion." Id. at 338.
57. See William Perry Pendley, The Establishment Clause and the Closure of "Sacred"
Public and Private Lands, 83 DENY. U. L. REV. 1023, 1026-27 (2006) ("Since 1971 ... the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined expansively what governmental activities violate the Establishment
Clause; the short answer . . . is that nearly any government involvement with religion is
unconstitutional." (footnote omitted)); see also Buck, supra note 9, at 400 (arguing that the recent
Establishment Clause jurisprudence reveals "a radical departure from the constitutional text
ratified in 1791").
58. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 697 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (observing
that "'flexibility' of [the] Court's Establishment Clause precedent leaves it incapable of consistent
application"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (regretting that the Court has not developed
clear guidelines for Establishment Clause actions to replace the Court's case-specific inquiries).
59. See Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying the Endorsement of Symbolic
Religious Speech, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 215 (2004) (asserting that courts have applied "a
patchwork of ad hoc and often irreconcilable dispositions" to remedial inquiries of Establishment
Clause violations). One commentator has even suggested that the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has made remedial efforts almost impossible. Garry, supra note 10, at 15.
60. See Budd, supra note 59, at 227. Budd notes that although the removal unquestionably
separates the government from improper speech, the remedial analysis must still examine the
neutrality of the removal. Id. at 232.
61. See, e.g., ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 186 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1036 (D. Neb. 2002),
rev'den banc, 419 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2005) (allowing a monument of the Ten Commandments to
remain on public property if it is moved to a different location). One court has even deemed
restitution to be an effective remedy to an Establishment Clause violation. See Ams. United for
Separation of Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F. Supp. 2d 862, 941 (S.D.
Iowa 2006), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007). Although the restitution
was overturned on appeal, at least one other court has agreed that restitution may be a valid
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a means of avoiding an Establishment Clause violation while still preserving a
religious display.62 Yet, as the sale of public land becomes a more popular
remedy, it remains infused with the same dissonance that plagues current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 63  The circuits have come to differing
conclusions on whether a transfer of land to a private entity is an effective
remedy. On one side, the Ninth Circuit has held such a transfer to be
ineffective in remedying the violation. 64 On the other side, the Seventh Circuit
has held that a transfer of land can cure the government's Establishment
Clause violation.65
1. The Ninth Circuit: The Transfer of Land as an Ineffective Remedy
a. A Private Tribute to Fallen Heroes
In 1934, J. Riley Bembry and several fellow members of the Death Valley
chapter of the VFW erected a small cross atop federally-owned Sunrise Rock
as a war memorial.66 For more than forty years, Bembry tended to the cross.67
When he became too old to continue his stewardship, his friend, Henry
remedy to an Establishment Clause violation. David T. Raimer, Note, Damages and Damocles:
The Propriety of Recoupment Orders as Remedies for Violations of the Establishment Clause, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1385, 1385-86 & n.6 (2008) (indicating that a Seventh Circuit decision,
Laskowski v. Spellings, 443 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 2006), vacated and remanded sub nom. by Univ.
of Notre Dame v. Laskowski, 127. S. Ct. 3051 (2007), suggested that restitution might be a viable
remedy under the Establishment Clause).
62. See, e.g., Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that, in the face of a lawsuit seeking removal of a display of the Ten Commandments,
the Mercier City Council chose to sell the land on which the display sat); Paulson v. City of San
Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), dismissed as moot sub nom. San Diegans
for the Mt. Soledad Nat'l War Mem'l v. City of San Diego, 475 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007) ("To
remedy the constitutional violation and to comply with the injunction, the City decided to sell the
land under the cross to a private organization."); Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F. Supp. 2d
567, 570 (D. Md. 2005) (explaining that the city of Frederick, Maryland sought to sell land
containing a donated Ten Commandments monument to avoid a potential Establishment Clause
violation). Not surprisingly, commentators have been split on the remedial effectiveness of a land
transfer. Compare Budd, supra note 59, at 239-40, 246 (arguing a transfer of land is only
effective if it physically separates the government from the religious display and is carried out in
a religiously neutral manner), with Lauderman, supra note 11, at 1230-31 (arguing that a land
transfer is remedially effective if it satisfies a five-prong test that incorporates the circumstances
of the transaction, the purpose behind the transfer, and its effects on private speech rights). For a
critique of both views, see discussion infra Part IlI.B.
63. See discussion infra Part II.
64. Buono v. Norton (Buono I1), 371 F.3d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he presence of a
religious symbol on once-public land that has been transferred into private hands may still violate
the Establishment Clause.").
65. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 705-06.
66. See Lake, supra note 14; Lake, supra note 13; see also NYSTROM, supra note 3, ch. 6, at
6.
67. Lake, supra note 13.
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68
Sandoz, took over the duties. Around 1998, after vandals destroyed a
previous incarnation of the cross, Sandoz wielded together two eight-inch
69
pieces of steel to form a cross, painted it white, and bolted it into the rock.
Over the years, area residents came to revere the cross atop Sunrise Rock. 0
However, controversy arose in 1999 when an individual petitioned the NPS to
build a dome-shaped Buddhist shrine known as a "stupa" near the site of the
cross. 7 The NPS responded by letter, rejecting the petition as required by
agency regulations,7
2 and stating that it also intended to remove the cross.
The legal battle erupted in October 1999 when the ACLU of Southern
California, tipped off by former NPS employee Frank Buono, threatened legal
action if the cross was not removed.7 4 After a three-month investigation into
the cross's legality and upon further deliberation, the NPS ultimately decided
75
to remove the cross.
b. If at First You Don 't Succeed, Try, Try Again: The Injunction and
Congressional Intervention
As area residents became aware of the NPS decision, their local
76
congressman, Representative Jerry Lewis, became involved. Over the next
two years, Congress included three provisions concerning the cross in a series
of appropriations bills.77 Congressional action continued even as the District
68. Id.
69. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by,
527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472); see also NYSTROM, supra note 3, ch. 6, at 6.
70. See Julie Cart, Lawmaker Seeks Land Swap to Let Mojave Cross Stand, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 2002, at B6; Lake, supra note 14; Lake, supra note 13. In time, the cross became more
than just a war memorial to area residents who began gathering regularly at the site for Easter
Sunrise services around 1984. Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1072.
71. Buono v. Norton (Buono 1), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1205-06 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd, 371
F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004); NYSTROM, supra note 3, ch. 6, at 6.
72. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.62(a) (2008) ("The installation of a monument, memorial, tablet,
structure, or other commemorative installation in a park area without the authorization of the
Director is prohibited.").
73. Buono/, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
74. Id. Buono served as Assistant Superintendent of the Mojave National Preserve in 1994
and 1995. Id. at 1207. He alerted the ACLU to the existence of the cross in 1999, after he left the
NPS. NYSTROM, supra note 3, ch. 6, at 6-7.
75. Buono 1, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1206; NYSTROM, supra note 3, ch. 6, at 6-7. The NPS
evaluated the cross's commemorative significance and determined it did not merit inclusion in the
National Register of Historic Places. Buono 1, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1206.
76. See Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1206; NYSTROM, supra note 3, ch. 6, at 7.
77. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248, §
8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551 (2002) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 431 (Supp. V 2005)); Department of
Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from and Response to
Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137, 115 Stat. 2230,
2278-79; Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. D, § 133, 114
Stat. 2763A-171, 2763A-230 (2000).
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Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment to
Buono and the ACLU in July 2002 (Buono ).78 Undeterred, in September
2003, Congress included yet another provision regarding the cross in an
appropriations bill. 79  In exchange for private property owned by Henry
Sandoz, section 8121 of this bill conveyed
to the Veterans Home of California-Barstow, Veterans of Foreign
Wars Post #385E . . . , all right, title, and interest of the United States
in and to a parcel of real property consisting of approximately one
acre in the Mojave National Preserve and designated (by section
8137 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002 (Public
Law 107-117; 115 Stat. 2278)) as a national memorial
commemorating United States participation in World War I and
honoring the American veterans of that war.
80
The statute provided Congress with a reversionary interest in the property
81
and directed the Secretary of the Interior to maintain the cross as a national
memorial.
82
Nine months later, the Ninth Circuit issued its first opinion in the case,
Buono v. Norton (Buono 11). 83 Judge Kozinski, writing for a three-judge panel,
affirmed the district court's injunction. 84  Mirroring the district court's
rationale, the panel dismissed the government's claim that Buono lacked
standing85 and discounted the government's attempts to distinguish the case
from controlling precedent. 86  Unconvinced and further noting the multiple
78. See Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. The district court applied Lemon and invoked
Justice O'Connor's endorsement standard to ask whether the cross had the effect of endorsing or
disapproving religion. Id. at 1214-15. The court found Separation of Church and State
Committee v. City of Eugene (SCSC), 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996), to be "materially
indistinguishable" from Buono, and noted that "it was 'simple' and 'straightforward' that the
presence of the cross had a primary effect that advanced religion, and thus was unconstitutional."
Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 (quoting SCSC, 93 F.3d at 620).
79. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121, 117
Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003).
80. Id. § 812 1(a), 117 Stat. at 1100. As consideration, Sandoz agreed to convey about five
acres of his property within the Preserve's boundaries. Id. § 8121(b), (c), 117 Stat. at 1100.
81. Id. § 8121(e), 117 Stat. at 1100. The interest would mature if the Secretary of the
Interior determined the property was no longer being used as a war memorial. Id.
82. Id. § 8121(a), 117 Stat. at 1100.
83. Buono v. Norton (Buono fl), 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004). The court heard arguments
in August 2003, one month before Congress passed the land transfer. Id. The court declined,
however, to accept the government's contention that the case was now moot due to the transfer.
Id. at 545.
84. Id. at 550.
85. Id. at 547-48 (explaining that an inability to "freely use" public land is a sufficient
injury-in-fact to confer standing).
86. Id. at 549. The government attempted to distinguish Buono II from SCSC; however, the
court determined:
These distinctions are of no moment .... [The particulars of the cross] make[] it no
less likely that the Sunrise Rock cross will project a message of government
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congressional actions to maintain the cross, the court held that a reasonable
observer could conclude the g.overnment endorsed the cross, and its
presumably non-secular message.
c. "Another Day" Arrives: The Ninth Circuit Decides Whether the
Sunrise Rock Transfer Violates the Establishment Clause
Despite the Ninth Circuit's holding, the NPS initiated the land transfer.
88
Buono then moved to enforce the district court's injunction or, in the
alternative, to modify the injunction to prohibit the land transfer.89 The district
court, in Buono v. Norton (Buono II1), enjoined the government from
proceeding with the land transfer.90  The government appealed and on
September 6, 2007, the Ninth Circuit issued its second opinion, Buono v.
Kempthorne (Buono IV).91 While the court's first opinion, Buono II, addressed
whether the Sunrise Rock cross itself violated the Establishment Clause,92 the
issue in Buono IV was whether the land transfer violated the injunction and, in
turn, the Establishment Clause.93 The court held that it did.94 Employing the
same rationale as the district court, the Ninth Circuit examined three aspects of
the land exchange: the govemment's oversight over the land following the
transfer,95 the method for effectuating the transfer,96 and the history leading up
to the transfer.
97
endorsement to a reasonable observer . . . . Nor does the remote location of Sunrise
Rock make a difference .... What is significant is that the Sunrise Rock cross, like the
SCSC cross, sits on public park land.
Id.
87. Id. at 550.
88. See Buono v. Kempthome (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007), amended
by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243
(U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472).
89. Buono v. Norton (Buono II1), 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff'd sub
noma. Buono v. Kempthome, 502 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by 527 F.3d 758 (9th
Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub noam. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No.
08-472).
90. Id. at 1182.
91. Buono IV, 502 F.3d 1069.
92. See Buono ll, 371 F.3d at 544-45.
93. See Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1071. The court noted that it had the opportunity to make
this determination in Buono II, but it "left for another day the question of 'whether a transfer
completed under section 8121 would pass constitutional muster."' Id. at 1082 (quoting Buono 11,
371 F.3d at 546).
94. Id. at 1086 ("The district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the government
from proceeding with the land exchange . . . and ordering the government to otherwise comply
with its prior injunction that it not permit the display of the Sunrise Rock cross in the Preserve."
(citation omitted)).
95. Id. at 1082-84.
96. Id. at 1084-85.
97. Id. at 1085.
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i. Government Control over the Cross Property
The Ninth Circuit first examined whether the district court abused its
discretion in concluding that the government would still exercise considerable
control over the cross after the transfer.98  The court read several NPS
authorizing statutes as a whole to determine that the "government retain[ed]
various rights of control over the cross and the property." 99  The court
concurred with the district court that the law establishing the cross as a national
memorial reserved management responsibilities to the NPS and, therefore,
gave the government an easement or a license over the property. 00  Most
importantly, however, the court put significant weight on the inclusion of the
government's reversionary interest in the property. 1 1  This reversionary
interest, the court emphasized, "result[ed] in ongoing government control over
the subject property, even after the transfer."'
10 2
ii. Method of the Land Exchange
Next, the Ninth Circuit turned to the method by which the property was
transferred. 10 3 The court noted that the normal NPS procedures authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to exchange federal land for non-federal land, 104 and
that these procedures allowed for a public hearing and required an open-
bidding process. 1°5 The transfer of the Sunrise Rock cross, according to the
court, deviated from these accepted standards. 106 Congress, the court said, had
acted outside of the normal procedures for disposing of federal property and, as
such, had demonstrated an "unusual involvement" in the transaction.' 0
98. Id at 1082-84.
99. Id at 1083; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (empowering the NPS to regulate and
promote "national parks, monuments, and reservations"); id. § 2 (granting the NPS with powers
of "supervision, management, and control" over national parks and monuments); id. § 3
(authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to make "rules and regulations ... for the use and
management of the parks, monuments, and reservations under the jurisdiction of the National
Park Service").
100. Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1083 ("Such an easement or license reflects ongoing control over
the property requiring compliance with constitutional requirements ... ").
101. Id. The court dismissed the government's contentions that reversionary interests are
standard clauses in government contracts and that the court must await exercise of the interest
before ruling on its application. Id. at 1084.
102. Id. at 1083-84.
103. Id. at 1084.
104. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 4601-22(b)).
105. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 4601-22(a), (b)).
106. Id. ("In this case, however, the decision to exchange the land was made by Congress and
authorized by a provision buried in an appropriations bill. The government did not hold a hearing
before enacting such exchange. Nor did the government open bidding to the general public."
(citation omitted)). The court rejected the government's argument that the VFW was the logical
purchaser because it had originally erected the cross. Id. at 1084-85.
107. Id. at 1085.
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iii. History of Congressional Involvement
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit examined the history of the government's efforts to
maintain the cross atop Sunrise Rock. 10 8 The court delineated the actions taken
by Congress regarding the cross and held that these actions led "to the
undeniable conclusion that the government's purpose in this case is to evade
the injunction and keep the cross in place."' 0 9 Agreeing with the district court,
the Ninth Circuit said the government "engaged in 'herculean efforts' to
preserve the cross atop Sunrise Rock," yet despite these efforts, the transfer
failed to cure the Establishment Clause violation.
1 0
d. The Amended Opinion and the Dissent from the Denial of Rehearing
En Bane
In May 2008, the Ninth Circuit issued an amended opinion in Buono v.
Kempthorne (Buono V), as well as a dissent from the court's denial of a
rehearing en banc. III The amendment made only one change to the opinion,
modifying a footnote concerning the Seventh Circuit's approach to remedying
an Establishment Clause violation by transferring land to a private party.
The amended footnote clarified the Ninth Circuit's stance:
The Seventh Circuit stated that "[a]bsent unusual circumstances, a
sale of real property is an effective way for a public body to end its
inappropriate endorsement of religion. We are aware, however, that
adherence to a formalistic standard invites manipulation. To avoid
such manipulation, we look to the substance of the transaction as
well as its form to determine whether government action endorsing
religion has actually ceased." Read as a whole, the Seventh Circuit
position looks at the issue on a transaction-by-transaction basis. We
agree with this approach. However, to the extent that Marshfield can
be read to adopt a presumption of the effectiveness of a land sale to
end a constitutional violation, we decline to adopt such a
presumption. The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause





111. Buono v. Kempthome (Buono V), 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom.
Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472).
112. Id. at759.
113. Id. at 779 n. 13 (citation omitted) (quoting Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000)). In contrast, the original footnote read:
Although the Seventh Circuit adopted a presumption that "a sale of real property is an
effective way for a public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of religion" in the
absence of "unusual circumstances," we decline to adopt such presumption. The
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Five judges dissented from the court's denial of a rehearing en banc. 114 The
dissent, authored by Judge O'Scannlain, harshly critiqued the majority for
"contraven[ing] governing Supreme Court precedent, creat[ing] a split with the
Seventh Circuit on multiple issues, and invit[ing] courts to encroach upon
private citizens' rights under both the speech and religion clauses of the First
Amendment." 5 It asserted that the majority misapplied the Seventh Circuit's
"unusual circumstances" exception to create a test that went well beyond
Supreme Court precedent.11 6  This new test, the dissent argued, enjoined a
private religious symbol simply because of the government's prior conduct,
despite the absence of any evidence of intimate government involvement with
the property. 117 The dissent further criticized the majority for flouting public
policy I 8 and misconstruing the merits of the case.' 19 In its conclusion, the
dissent admitted that it sympathized with the majority's "frustration that a
court can lose control of its injunction by the enjoined party's unanticipated
abdication of ownership . . . ."'T However, the dissent recognized that "such a
risk is inherent in our trade, and for good reason.''
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence recognizes the need to conduct a
fact-specific inquiry in this area.
Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1082 n.13 (citation omitted) (quoting Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491).
114. See Buono V, 527 F.3d at 760.
115. Id. (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
116. Id. at 762. The dissent argued that the Seventh Circuit's "unusual circumstances"
analysis "merely incorporated well-established Supreme Court precedent concerning when state
action may be imputed to private parties despite the transfer of once-public land: a continuation of
state action may be found when the government remain[s] intimately involved in exclusively
public functions ...." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting
Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492). Under this approach, the dissent asserted, the only relevant issue is
whether there is actual state control, not the government's intent or method in effectuating the
transfer. Id.
117. Id. at 762-63. The appropriate remedy, according to the dissent, was to enjoin the
government's improper conduct rather than encroach upon a private party's rights. Id. at 764.
118. Id. at 765 ("By altogether ignoring the dispositive considerations in Van Orden, the
Buono IV opinion vitiates the Supreme Court's caution against applying the endorsement test in a
manner that has 'radical implications for our public policy."' (quoting Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768 (1995))).
119. Id. at 765-67. The dissent criticized the majority's reliance on statutes as evidence of
government control, arguing the "trivial, fleeting duties" authorized by the statutes did not
sufficiently constitute intimate involvement. Id. at 766. It also debated the majority's decision to
require a congressional land transfer to adhere to an agency's procedural rules. Id. at 766-67.
Finally, it questioned the majority's logic in faulting the government for attempting to cure the
violation. Id. at 767.
120. Id. at 768.
121. Id.
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2. The Seventh Circuit: The Transfer of Land as an Effective Cure
a. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield
The Seventh Circuit first heard arguments in Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield in October 1999.122 This case centered
on a fifteen-foot marble statue of Jesus Christ that the city of Marshfield
received as a gift in 1959 from the John Eisen Assembly, Fourth Degree
Knights of Columbus.' 23 In 1964, a member of the Knights of Columbus,
Henry Praschak, offered to construct signs, picnic tables, and outdoor grills for
the site; the city responded by agreeing to establish a public park at the site,
complete with electrical service and support infrastructure. Thirty-nine
years after the statue was erected, in 1998, Clarence Reinders, a local
businessman and member of the Freedom from Religion Foundation (FFRF),
asked the city to move the statue onto private property. 125 When the city did
not respond to his request, Reinders and the FFRF filed suit seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief. 126
In wake of the suit, the city posted disclaimers near the statue, reading "[t]he
location of this statue ... does not reflect an endorsement of a religious sect or
belief by the city of Marshfield. ' ' 127 The city also agreed to sell 0.15 acres of
park land on which the statue stood to the Henry Praschak Memorial Fund.
128
Litigation continued, however, and after the parties stipulated that the city did
not provide maintenance or electrical service to the parcel, the district court
granted the city's motion for summary judgment. 129
Reinders and FFRF appealed, arguing that the land sale was a sham
transaction designed to circumvent the Establishment Clause.' The city, on
the other hand, asserted that it was a valid transaction and any religious
expression on the property belonged to the Fund, not the city.' 31 Judge Kanne,
writing for the Seventh Circuit panel, agreed with the city, focusing on the
122. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2000).
123. Id. at 489. The statue was fifteen feet tall and depicted Christ with his "arms open in
prayer, standing atop a large sphere, which in turn rests atop a base bearing the inscription in
twelve-inch block letters, 'Christ Guide Us On Our Way."' Id. The statue, placed on
undeveloped property owned by the city, faced the main thoroughfare into the city. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id Reinders alleged that the statue caused him to avoid the park and to take alternate
routes of transportation when coming into the city. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (omission in original).
128. Id. at 490. After the sale, which met all Wisconsin state statutory requirements, the city
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distinction between private speech and public speech. 132  Recognizing this
difference, the court stated, "[a]bsent unusual circumstances, a sale of real
property is an effective way for a public body to end its inappropriate
endorsement of religion."' 33  The court reviewed the circumstances
surrounding the transfer and concluded that the "sale validly extinguished any
government endorsement of religion."'
' 34
132. Id. The court noted "there is 'a crucial difference between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."' Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).
133. Id In articulating this presumption, the court noted the line of "public function" cases
of the Supreme Court in which a public motive was imputed to a private party only where "a set
of unusual facts and circumstances demonstrated that the government remained intimately
involved in exclusively public functions that had been delegated to private organizations ......
Id. at 491-92. These "public function" cases originated with Terry v. Adams, a civil rights case in
which the Court held that an election was an exclusive government function such that a private
political association's exclusion of African-Americans in its primary elections amounted to a state
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) ("The only
election that has counted in this Texas county for more than fifty years has been that held by the
Jaybirds from which Negroes were excluded. The Democratic primary and the general election
have become no more than the perfunctory ratifiers of the choice .... ). In a similar case, Marsh
v. Alabama, the Court held that a town owned by a private company could not prohibit the
distribution of religious literature because its governance and enforcement powers amounted to
state action. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). The Court in Evans v. Newton
explained its rationale in these opinions, stating,
[c]onduct that is formally "private" may become so entwined with governmental
policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the
constitutional limitations placed upon state action . . . . Thus we held ...that the
exercise of constitutionally protected rights on the public streets of a company town
could not be denied by the owner .... We have also held that where a State delegates
an aspect of the elective process to private groups, they become subject to the same
restraints as the State. That is to say, when private individuals or groups are endowed
by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or
instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (citations omitted) (holding that a tract of land
deeded to the City of Macon, Georgia for use as a private park only by white residents constituted
a public institution subject to the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149, 151-53 (1978) (holding that a warehouseman's proposed private sale of goods
entrusted to him under state statute did not rise to the level of state action for class action
litigation).
134. Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492. In evaluating the circumstances of the sale, the court
considered the Wisconsin law governing municipal land sales, the price paid for the parcel, the
responsibility for utilities to the parcel, and the restrictive covenant in the deed. Id. at 492-93. It
concluded, "we find no extraordinary circumstances that justify disregarding the sale for the
purposes of endorsing religion, and we find that the City did not engage in governmental action
endorsing religion by selling the property at issue to a religious organization." Id. at 493. The
court did, however, go on to examine whether the Establishment Clause violation continued
despite the land transfer. Id. Noting the obvious non-secular message of the statue and the park's
status as a traditional public forum, the court concluded,
the City has granted the Fund preferential access to a public forum, which violates the
Establishment Clause .... [T]he proximity of the statue to City property and the lack
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b. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles
Five years after Marshfield, the Seventh Circuit decided Mercier v.
Fraternal Order of Eagles.135  Mercier concerned a granite monument
inscribed with the Ten Commandments that was erected by the local chapter of
the Fraternal Order of Eagles in a La Crosse, Wisconsin public park.
136
Erected in June 1965, the monument was dedicated to the efforts of several
hundred high-school students who had helped battle severe flooding the
previous April. 137  For the next several decades, the Eagles maintained the
monument and illuminated it at night with a light attached to the roof of their
headquarters. 1
38
The first challenge to the monument came in 1985 when a resident asked the
La Crosse Common Council to remove the monument, a request that the
Council denied. 139  In 2001, the FFRF asked the Council to remove the
monument from the park and, again, the Council denied the request.'
40
Recognizing the potential for a lawsuit, however, the Council reached an
agreement with the Eagles whereby the city would sell them the twenty-foot by
twenty-two-foot parcel of park land on which the monument stood. 14 1 The sale
was finalized in August 2002, and two fences were erected and signage was
placed indicating the Eagles' ownership of the property. 12 During the
pendency of the sale, the FFRF filed a lawsuit challenging the display of the
monument. 143 In February 2004, the district court granted summary judgment
of visual definition between City and Fund property creates a perception of improper
endorsement of religion by the City and constitutes a violation of the Establishment
Clause.
Id. at 494, 496. On remand, the Seventh Circuit directed the district court to work with the parties
to remedy the violation by distinguishing between City and Fund property. Id. at 497.
135. 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2005).
136. Id at 694. The monument also included an eagle grasping the American flag and the
"all-seeing eye" associated with the dollar bill. Id. at 694-95. The monument was located in a
park adjacent to the Eagles' La Crosse headquarters, in the northeastern comer of the park,
directly across from the headquarters. Id. at 695.
137. Id. at 696. During the monument's dedication ceremony, special attention was paid to
the students' efforts. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. A lawsuit was subsequently filed but the case was dismissed in 1987 for lack of
standing. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. Prior to the sale, the city adopted a resolution explaining that the monument was
given to the city to honor the students' efforts during the flood. Id In authorizing the sale in July
2002, the City Council again expressly reaffirmed the monument's purpose. Id. at 697.
142. Id. at 697. The Eagles first erected a four-foot high steel fence, and then the City
erected a second four-foot high wrought-iron fence immediately outside the Eagles' fence. Id.
Both the Eagles and the city placed permanent signs indicating the land was private property. Id.
at 697-98.
143. Id. at 696-97. "The district court later denied the individual plaintiffs' motion to
proceed anonymously" and twenty additional named parties were added. Id. The plaintiffs all
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for the FFRF, finding that the display of the monument constituted an
Establishment Clause violation and that the sale of the land was
unconstitutional. 144 The city and the Eagles appealed.
145
On appeal, Judge Manion, writing for the Seventh Circuit panel,
acknowledged that the presence of the monument from 1965 to 2002 may have
violated the Establishment Clause, but it restricted its analysis to whether the
sale by the city was an independent violation. 146  The court began with a
detailed analysis of Marshfield, highlighting its "unusual circumstances"
rationale. 147 Applying this precedent, the Seventh Circuit accused the district
court of narrowly reading the holding in Marshfield148 to foreclose the
possibility of a sale as an effective remedy. 149 The court noted that Marshfield
offered an alternative to the removal of an offending display: a sale that did not
involve "unusual circumstances." 150  The court examined the particular
circumstances of the transaction at issue to conclude that the "sale clearly
[met] the standards set out in Marshfield."151 Even assuming that Marshfield
was not controlling precedent, the court concluded that the sale satisfied the
Lemon test. 152  As such, the court concluded the sale of the parcel was a
alleged that as residents of La Crosse, they avoided the park because of the monument, or that
they became emotionally disturbed when traveling near the park. Id. at 697.
144. See Mercier v. City of La Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1005-10, 1019 (W.D. Wis.
2004), rev'd and remanded sub noma. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693 (7th Cir.
2005). The district court held that the only remedy was to return the land to the city and require
the city to remove the monument from the park. Id. at 1019-20.
145. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 698.
146. Id. at 699 (assuming that the monument was an Establishment Clause violation in order
to reach the issue of whether the land transfer itself violated the Clause).
147. Id at 700.
148. Id. at 701 ("The Appellees [and the district court], however, misread Marshfield.
Marshfield considered not just whether the restrictive covenant was constitutional, but also
whether the sale itself was a sham and constituted an endorsement of religion by the City .... ).
149. Id. ("Thus, although Marshfield focused on the original placement of the statue and
whether the sale rectified the Establishment Clause violation, that case also made clear that the
sale of the parcel was permissible under the Establishment Clause."). The court continued,
stating, "[r]emoval is always an option, but as Marshfield holds, it is not a necessary solution to a
First Amendment challenge." Id. at 702.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 704. Specifically, the court focused on the sale's compliance with Wisconsin state
law, the fact that the Eagles paid fair market value for the land, the Eagles' assumption of the
traditional roles of ownership of the monument, and the secular history behind the monument. Id.
at 702-03. The court determined that the location of the monument was not "a setting where the
presence of government [was] pervasive and inescapable." Id. at 703 (citing Am. Jewish Cong. v.
City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 126 (7th Cir. 1987)). It concluded that the extensive efforts at
distinguishing between the public park and the private parcel showcased the city's good faith
attempt to dissuade any perception of religious endorsement. Id. at 703-04.
152. Id. at 704. In its Lemon analysis, the court deferred to the city's stated secular purpose.
See id. This deference was based on the Supreme Court's endorsement of this notion of
deference to a government's proffered purpose. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290, 308 (2000) ("When a governmental entity professes a secular purpose for an arguably
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"constitutionally appropriate" means of curing the city's Establishment Clause
violation.'
53
II. REJECTING BUONO: HOW THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
DEMONSTRATES THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ERRORS
The disagreement between the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit should
come as no surprise given the Supreme Court's "schizophrenic" interpretation
of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.
15 4 Beginning with Lemon 155
and moving forward through Van Orden156 and McCreary County,15 7 the Court
has yet to articulate a clear, bright-line rule for what constitutes an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion. Instead, the best the Court has
offered is a case-by-case determination that leaves it to individual courts to
determine whether a violation has occurred. 158 Once a court has determined
that a violation has occurred, it is saddled with a similar problem in analyzing
whether a sale of the land cures the violation. 159 As Buono, Marshfield, and
Mercier demonstrate, courts are examining similar facts under the same law
and are arriving at widely contrasting conclusions. 60
In the Buono line of cases, the Ninth Circuit shoehorned Supreme Court
precedent into an untenable position in order to support its conclusions. 61 The
court did so in four ways. First, and most glaringly, the court widened the
scope of the Seventh Circuit's "unusual circumstances" doctrine to encompass
almost any government action, even government action divesting itself of the
religious policy, the government's characterization is, of course, entitled to some deference."). In
the same vein, the Supreme Court has established a notion of deference to the constitutionality of
congressional actions. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). In DeBartolo Corp., the Court noted the long history of this
deference, under which "the Court will construe the statute to avoid [constitutional] problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress." Id The Seventh and
Ninth Circuits have adopted this presumption as well. See Jideonwo v. INS, 224 F.3d 692, 700
n.7 (7th Cir. 2000); Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. United States, 110 F.3d 688,
693 (9th Cir. 1997).
153. Mercier, 395 F.3d at 705. A short dissent following the opinion cited no points of law
but criticized the majority for allowing the monument to remain despite the city's "stubborn
refusal" to separate itself from the religious display. Id. at 706 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
154. See Garry, supra note 10, at 7 (noting the Establishment Clause's doctrinal
inconsistency has been labeled as a "sort of jurisprudential schizophrenia" (quoting Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 717 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn and reh'g
granted, 192 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1999)).
155. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
156. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
157. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
158. See discussion supra Part l.A.
159. See discussion supra Part I.B.
160. See infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
161. See discussion infra Parts II.A-D.
Catholic University Law Review
religious message. 162  Second, the court misconstrued and misapplied the
Supreme Court's "public function" rationale to impute state action onto a
private party that was not intimately involved in an exclusively public
function.163 Third, the court ignored the presumption of constitutionality owed
to congressional statutes and instead assumed a malicious intent inherent in
Congress's actions. 64 Finally, the court incorrectly employed the "reasonable
person" standard by partially blinding the reasonable observer to several
significant facts. 165 The Seventh Circuit, conversely, properly considered and
appropriately applied Supreme Court precedent to adopt a pragmatic
approach. 6In examining the Ninth Circuit's holding through the prism of the
Seventh Circuit, the errors of Buono become clear.
A. The Scope of "Unusual Circumstances"
In 2000, the Seventh Circuit in Marshfield announced that "[a]bsent unusual
circumstances, a sale of real property is an effective way for a public body to
end its inappropriate endorsement of religion."'' 67 Five years later, the court
reinforced this presumption in Mercier.168 The Mercier court articulated three
such "unusual circumstances":
a sale that did not comply with applicable state law governing the
sale of land by a municipality; a sale to a straw purchaser that left the
City with continuing power to exercise the duties of ownership; [and]
a sale well below fair market value resulting in a gift to a religious
organization. 169
Although the court indicated that this list was not exhaustive, the list suggests
that a certain degree of bad faith must be present in all unusual
circumstances.1 70 Assuming this suggestion is accurate, for a court to find the
162. See discussion infra Part II.A.
163. See discussion infra Part Il.B.
164. See discussion infra Part II.C.
165. See discussion infra Part L.D.
166. See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono V), 527 F.3d 758, 761-64 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
167. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.
2000) (concluding there were no unusual circumstances in the sale of a parcel of a public park
containing a statue of Jesus Christ). Although the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt this
presumption, at least one other federal court has. See Chambers v. City of Frederick, 373 F.
Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2005).
168. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir. 2005) ("The sale,
however, must still satisfy the requirement of Marshfield, namely, there must be no unusual
circumstances surrounding the sale of the parcel of land so as to indicate an endorsement of
religion.").
169. Id (citations omitted).
170. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491 (suggesting that courts must look to whether the
"typical sort of improprieties" that could be involved in a land transfer exist in a particular case).
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existence of unusual circumstances in a land transfer, it must find that the
government was engaging in some sort of deception, fraud, conspiracy, or
scheme. 171 Neither the court in Marshfield nor the court in Mercier found
sufficient evidence of bad faith to conclude that unusual circumstances existed
in the respective land transfers. 72
The Buono court, however, did find unusual circumstances to exist in the
transfer of the Sunrise Rock cross to the VFW,17 3 and it did so by applying
roughly the same factors as those articulated in Mercier1
74 to similar facts. 1
The different conclusions can be explained by the Buono court's refusal to
adopt the Seventh Circuit's presumption that a sale of real property effectively
remedies an Establishment Clause violation. 176  In denying the land transfer
presumptive validity, the Ninth Circuit necessarily began its analysis with a
suspicious eye toward Congress's actions.' 77  As the court examined the
actions of Congress in preserving the cross, this suspicion allowed it to expand
the scope of "unusual circumstances" to include almost any governmental
171. See, e.g., id at 492 (noting that a "continuing and excessive involvement between the
government and private citizens" can exist through various "improprieties" such as a legally
improper sale, a sale below market-rate, the purchase through a "straw purchaser" under which
the city retains actual control, or a "sham arrangement," all of which suggest bad faith on the part
of the government).
172. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 704 ("[T]his sale clearly meets the standards set out in
Marshfield."); Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 493 ("[W]e find no extraordinary circumstances that
justify disregarding the sale for the purpose of endorsing religion .... ").
173. Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1085 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by,
527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S.
Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) (concluding the government engaged in "herculean efforts" to
preserve the Sunrise Rock cross).
174. See id at 1082. The court examined "(1) the government's continuing oversight and
rights in the site containing the cross after the proposed land exchange; (2) the method for
effectuating the land exchange; and (3) the history of the government's efforts to preserve the
cross." Id. The only significant difference between these factors and the Mercier factors is that
Buono's factors included the history of governmental efforts to preserve the cross. See supra text
accompanying note 169 for a discussion of the factors considered in Mercier.
175. The only two pertinent facts differentiating Buono from Mercier and Marshfield were
the religious symbol at issue and the government entity seeking to transfer the offending land.
Compare Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1071 (noting that Congress sought to transfer property containing
Latin Cross), with Mercier, 395 F.3d at 694 (describing a municipal government's efforts to
transfer property containing Ten Commandments), and Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 489-90
(involving a municipal government that sought to transfer property containing statue of Jesus
Christ).
176. See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono ), 527 F.3d 758, 779, n.13 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472); Buono
IV, 502 F.3d at 1082 n.13.
177. For instance, this predisposition is evident in the Ninth Circuit's opinion where the court
addresses whether the government retained control over the cross by immediately discounting the
validity of the transfer. See Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1082 ("Although Congress sought to transfer
the property to the VFW, a private entity, the various statutes ... evince continuing government
control.").
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action concerning the cross. 17 8 Thus, a standard reverter clause in the contract
was read as evidence that "the government's ongoing control over the
property" will cause "the parties [to] conduct themselves in the shadow of that
control. 179 Congress's decision to bypass NPS administrative procedures and
conduct the land transfer itself was seen as "evidence that the government is
seeking to circumvent the injunction."' 80  Finally, and most curiously,
Congress's multiple attempts to find an effective remedy for the Establishment
Clause violation were taken by the court to mean "that the government's
purpose ... [was] to evade the injunction and keep the cross in place."'
' 81
In misapplying the Seventh Circuit's rationale, the Ninth Circuit improperly
expanded the scope of "unusual circumstances." The court, armed with a
built-in suspicion of congressional action, broadened "unusual circumstances"
to include both the usual-a standard reverter clause, and the circumstantial-
congressional remedial efforts. 18 2  This expansion effectively prohibits any
affirmative government action in remedying an Establishment Clause
violation. It restricts the remedial avenues open to the government, leaving
removal as the only available option and forcing the government down a path
of hostility toward religion.' The Ninth Circuit thus created a strict
"separation of Church and State" stance, a position from which the Supreme
Court has regressed over the last half-century.
184
B. The Supreme Court's Public Function Jurisprudence
In footnote thirteen of Buono IV and Buono V, the Ninth Circuit cited the
Supreme Court's public function doctrine as evidence that a transfer of public
property to a private party does not presumptively cure a constitutional
178. See Buono V, 527 F.3d at 762 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc) (arguing that the Buono IV holding "creat[ed] an 'unusual circumstances' test that
extend[ed] well beyond the limited circumstances in which state action persists").
179. Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1084.
180. Id. at 1085.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1082, 1084-85.
183. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accusing the Court of "reflect[ing] an unjustified
hostility toward religion" by holding that a display of a creche in a county courthouse had the
principal effect of advancing religion, and therefore, violated the Establishment Clause).
184. See, e.g., DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 103-04 (2002) (noting that, in practice, the Court has
"implemented a less restrictive line of demarcation between church and state"); see also Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (asserting the wall of separation
metaphor "has proved all but useless as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication").
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violation.' 85 The court, however, misconstrued this precedent. 186 In Evans v.
Newton, a public function case cited by the Ninth Circuit in Bouno IV and
Buono V's footnote 13,187 the Supreme Court held that trustees of a private
park could not enforce racially discriminatory provisions in a deed because the
circumstances showed that the govemment was intimately entangled in the
park's operation. 8 8  From other similar cases during the same period, the
Supreme Court developed a public function jurisprudence that "found a
continuation of state action when a set of unusual facts and circumstances
demonstrated that the government remained intimately involved in exclusively
public functions that had been delegated to private organizations."
' 189
However, these cases are relevant only where there exists "continuing and
excessive involvement between the government and private citizens."
190
Excessive entanglement between the state and the private party is thus a
prerequisite that must be satisfied before a court can examine whether a state's
action can be imputed to a private entity.'
91
In Buono, the Ninth Circuit did not acknowledge this threshold question.
Instead, it circuitously employed the public function cases to suggest that a
land transfer did not presumptively cure a constitutional violation. 192  The
court used these cases-cases in which there were unusual circumstances that
evinced state control-to reject a presumption that a land transfer is an
effective remedy absent unusual circumstances.1 93 The court made this blanket
assertion without ever considering the close relationship needed to impute state
action to the private party or addressing the unique factors present in the public
185. See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono P), 527 F.3d 758, 779, n.13 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted sub noma. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472); Buono
IV, 502 F.3d at 1082 n.13.
186. See Buono V, 527 F.3d at 762 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc).
187. Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1082 n.13.
188. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966).
189. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir.
2000) (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946))
(emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158-60 (1978) (reviewing the rights and
remedies of commercial transactions and holding that the state had not delegated an exclusive
function to the private party); Evans, 382 U.S. at 301-02 (examining the relationship between a
city and a private park, including its maintenance by the city and its tax exemption status, to
conclude that "the predominant character and purpose of [the] park are municipal"); Terry, 345
U.S. at 469 (concluding that state-sponsored elections had become no more than "perfunctory
ratifiers" of a discriminatory private election).
192. See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono k), 527 F.3d 758, 779, n.13 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472); Buono
IV, 502 F.3d at 1082 n.13.
193. See Buono V, 527 F.3d at 779 n.13; Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1082 n.13.
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function cases that are not necessarily present in every case.' 94  In blindly
employing the public function doctrine to discredit the Seventh Circuit's
presumption, the Ninth Circuit plainly misconstrued the doctrine.
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit misapplied the Supreme Court's doctrine to the
facts of the case. Under a public function analysis, the government must
remain "intimately involved in exclusively public functions."' 95  In Buono,
however, little evidence existed to indicate that the government would remain
intimately involved with the cross after the transfer.196 Although the court
argued the reversionary interest and the other statutes demonstrated
governmental control, 197 it failed to show the sort of day-to-day control that
would establish intimate involvement. 98 The court also did not address how
the maintenance of a cross was an exclusively public function. 99 The cross,
like many other private parcels, was located on a very small swath of private
property within a very large national preserve. 20 It certainly cannot be
suggested that there is an exclusively public function in the maintenance of
Sunrise Rock but not in the maintenance of a parcel containing a ranch, home,
or other private property. In selectively employing the public function doctrine
as such, the Ninth Circuit clearly misapplied Supreme Court precedent.
20 1
C. Deference to Governmental Actions
Closely tied to the "unusual circumstances" precedent and the public
function doctrine is judicial deference to the validity of governmental actions.
The Supreme Court has advised that in statutory construction, courts should
avoid unnecessary unconstitutional conclusions because "Congress, like this
194. See Buono V, 527 F.3d at 779 n.13; Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1082 n.13.
195. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th
Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
196. See Buono V, 527 F.3d at 763 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc) (asserting that absent from the Buono majority opinion "is any evidence that the
government has maintained or will maintain or support the Sunrise Rock cross after the land
transfer")
197. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
198. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (holding that unusual
circumstances existed in a private park that was such an "integral part" of the city that the city
regularly "swept, manicured, watered, patrolled, and maintained" the park).
199. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 (1978) (explaining that the dominant
feature of the public function doctrine is the exclusivity of the function). In Flagg Brothers, the
Court reasoned that while the elections in Terry and the streets in Marsh had exclusivity evincing
continuing government control, the sale in Flagg Brothers did not. Id. at 158-60.
200. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27-28, Kempthorne v. Buono, No. 08-472 (U.S.
Oct. 10, 2008) (asserting "in the American West, it is not unusual for private land to be
intermingled with public land").
201. See Buono V, 527 F.3d at 763 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc) (criticizing the Buono IV opinion for flouting the "fundamental principle of judicial
restraint" by invalidating the land transfer without finding that the government would remain
intimately involved in maintaining the cross after the land transfer).
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Court, is bound by and swears an oath to uphold the Constitution. 2 °2 Thus,
courts should "not lightly assume that Congress intended to infringe
constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power constitutionally forbidden
it."'203 This rationale requires courts to first make an effort to find a reasonable
and constitutional purpose in a congressional statute before imputing a
malicious motive.20
4
Both the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have previously recognized
this notion of congressional deference. 205 The Seventh Circuit followed this
precedent. 206 In Buono, however, the Ninth Circuit ignored it.20 7 The Ninth
Circuit read the congressional statutes regarding the cross as demonstrative of
a congressional desire to violate the Constitution. 208 This reading squarely
contradicted the court's own precedent and, more importantly, Supreme Court
precedent.209 Further, in its opinion, the court never seriously considered any
legitimate purposes behind Congress's actions, and instead baselessly
concluded that the "government's purpose [was] .. .to evade the injunction
and keep the cross in place., 210 Rather than look at the fact of the sale itself,
which would have divested the government of any direct involvement with the
cross, the court looked past it, straining for hints of an improper congressional
intent in making the sale.211 By so doing, the Ninth Circuit not only failed to
202. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988).
203. Id.
204. See Buono V, 527 F.3d at 763 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc) ("[T]he deference owed to Congress forecloses us from striking down legislation based
upon a presumption that the government will violate the Constitution in the future.").
205. See Jideonwo v. INS, 224 F.3d 692, 700 n.7 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e are mindful of our
obligation to presume that Congress intended to act consistent with the dictates of the
Constitution."); Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. v. United States, 110 F.3d 688, 693
(9th Cir. 1997) ("When reviewing congressional enactments... for constitutional infirmities, we
give 'great weight to the decision of Congress."' (internal citation omitted)).
206. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 704 (7th Cir. 2005).
207. See Buono V, 527 F.3d at 763 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc).
208. See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007), amended
by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243
(U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) ("[T]he various statutes, when read as a package, evince
continuing government control.").
209. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians, 110 F.3d at 693.
210. Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1085. But see Mercier, 395 F.3d at 705 (finding a secular motive,
namely, to avoid the appearance of endorsing a religious message, in the municipal government's
decision to sell land on which sat a monument of the Ten Commandments).
211. See Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1085 (citing congressional action regarding the cross to
support a conclusion that Congress sought to continue an improper endorsement of religion). But
see Mercier, 395 F.3d at 705 (noting that the sale of land containing a religious display is itself a
secular motive).
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apply the requisite deference due congressional statutes, but actually adopted a
presumption against validity.
D. The Reasonable Observer Standard
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit improperly employed the "reasonable observer"
standard utilized by the Supreme Court in an endorsement analysis.2 12 This
test, articulated by Justice O'Connor in her elaboration on a plurality opinion,
requires that "the reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be
deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which
the religious display appears. ' 21 3  In Buono IV, the court employed this
standard by hypothesizing:
[A] reasonable observer aware of the history of the cross would
know of the government's attempts to preserve it and the denial of
access to other religious symbols. Even a less informed reasonable
observer would perceive governmental endorsement of the message,
given that "[n]ational parklands and preserves embody the notion of
government ownership."
214
Starting from this inquiry, the court easily concluded that the land transfer
would not prevent a reasonable observer from believing the government
endorsed the religious message. 215 However, the court here did not give the
216reasonable observer all of the facts. It made the observer aware of the
government's "attempts to preserve [the cross] and the denial of access to other
religious symbols," 2  but it did not enlighten the observer as to the complete
seventy-year history of the cross, its dedication as a war memorial, or the many
congressional efforts to preserve it as a war memorial.2  Thus, by partially
blinding the observer as to the totality of the facts, the court was able to easily
conclude that a reasonable observer would perceive governmental
212. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778-79 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (discussing the knowledge that a
court should attribute to a "reasonable observer [who] evaluates whether a challenged
governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement of religion").
213. Id. at 780.
214. Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1086 (internal citation omitted).
215. Id. The court held that "[n]othing in the present posture of the case alters" the fact the
sale will not minimize the governmental endorsement of religion. Id.
216. See, e.g., Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (critiquing Justice Steven's dissent for adopting a reasonable observer standard that is
nothing more than a poorly informed "casual passerby"). Justice O'Connor put forth a reasonable
observer that she equated to the "reasonable person" in tort law, in which the determination is not
on the perspective of any particular individual but rather on a community-based "reasonable"
individual. Id. at 779-80.
217. Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1086.
218. See NYSTROM, supra note 3, ch. 6, at 6-8 (outlining the history of the Sunrise Rock
cross).
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endorsement. 2 19 Perhaps if the Ninth Circuit had lifted the veil and provided
the reasonable observer with all the facts, the reasonable observer would have
concluded otherwise.
In viewing Buono through the prism of the Seventh Circuit's jurisprudence,
the errors of the Ninth Circuit are brought to light. The Seventh Circuit's
presumption that a land transfer is an effective remedy to an Establishment
Clause violation easily trumps the Ninth Circuit's holding because it is a more
established and more balanced approach. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand,
twisted existing precedent and strained Supreme Court doctrine to reject the
Seventh Circuit's presumption. It handcuffed government actors and limited
their options in solving complicated jurisprudential and social problems.
III. REMEDYING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT BY ADOPTING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S
APPROACH
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is broken. The
Court knows it. 22  Commentators know it.22 1 This jurisprudence is so difficult
in practice that the Court issued two opinions on the same day applying two
222different rationales to arrive at two contrasting holdings. Such uneven
treatment has left lower courts with little guidance in deciding Establishment
223clause cases. It leaves the courts with even less guidance in providing
219. Buono IV, 502 F.3d at 1086. In this respect, the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasonable
observer standard presented by Justice Stevens in Pinette, in which a court must determine
whether any observer of the religious display would likely perceive a governmental endorsement.
See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[T]he incoherence of the Court's decisions in this area renders the Establishment Clause
impenetrable and incapable of consistent application.").
221. See WITTE, supra note 30, at 3 (arguing the recent trend in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has "bred not only frustration about the vast inconsistencies of the American
experiment but doubts about its very efficacy"); Buck, supra note 9, at 415-16 (listing criticisms
of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Marques, supra note 31, at 843-44 (noting
the jurisprudence's unpredictability, inconsistency, complexity, and frustration).
222. Compare Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691-92 (holding that a monument of the Ten
Commandments placed on the state capitol grounds did not violate the Establishment Clause),
with McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (holding that the posting of the Ten
Commandments within the county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause).
223. See Card v. City of Everett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). The court noted that
in the wake of Van Orden and McCreary County, courts have described the current state of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence as "purgatory" and "Limbo .... Id. In a concurrence in
Card, Circuit Judge Fernandez likewise lamented that "[t]he still stalking Lemon test and the
other tests and factors, which have floated to the top of this chaotic ocean from time to time in
order to answer specific questions, are so indefinite and unhelpful that Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has not become more fathomable." Id. at 1023-24 (Fernandez, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
Catholic University Law Review
appropriate remedies for Establishment Clause violations. 224 After over thirty
years of inconsistency, the Supreme Court now has the opportunity to clarify
its case law for both Establishment Clause violations and remedial measures.
The time is ripe for the Court to establish a clear and consistent jurisprudence.
Salazar v. Buono offers just that opportunity.
225
A. Why This Circuit Split Matters to the Supreme Court
As the judicial landscape stands now, the very same display may be
constitutional in Wisconsin but unconstitutional in California.22 6 For similarly
situated litigants in these courts, the outcome of their cases rests not so much
on the merits of their cases, but rather, on the location of the courthouses. Not
only does such a discrepancy prevent uniformity within the federal court
system, it also treats citizens of one state differently from citizens of another.
This disparity is especially troubling given that an Establishment Clause claim
usually involves a state or municipal governmental defendant. 227 As such, a
citizen's ability to seek redress from his local government is as varied as the
locale's climate or geography, even though redress is sought under the very
same constitutional guarantee. This inconsistent treatment has affected a broad
cross-section of society. 228  Undoubtedly, such a wide-spread pockmarked
treatment of the Constitution is hardly the national legal environment
envisioned by the Founders or desired by the Supreme Court. 229 The Court,
224. See Budd, supra note 59, at 212 (explaining that the remedial analysis for an
Establishment Clause violation is "an ad hoc and often superficial exercise with little doctrinal
grounding").
225. The government filed a petition for writ of certiorari on October 10, 2008. See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Kempthorne v. Buono, No. 08-472 (October 10, 2008). It was granted on
February 23, 2009. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472).
226. Compare Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono V), 527 F.3d 758, 783 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472), with
Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005).
227. See Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 669, 673 (2003). Since 1947, the Supreme Court has decided over sixty Establishment
Clause cases, of which a "vast majority" have been challenging state activities. Id. By way of
comparison, only several Establishment Clause cases have been brought against the federal
government. Id. at 673 n.20.
228. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence "leaves courts, governments, and believers and
non-believers alike confused").
229. Perhaps enticing for the Court, Buono presents a unique opportunity to revisit and
finally settle its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Over three years have passed since the
Court decided Van Orden and McCreary County. Enough time has passed for the Court to
recognize that those two cases have done little to advance Establishment Clause jurisprudence. If
anything, they have added discord to dissonance such that courts are straining to fashion an
underlying holding from the two contrasting opinions. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The
Constitutionality of Religious Symbolism After McCreary and Van Orden, 12 TEX. REv. L. &
POL. 93, 106-07 (2007). Without a clear path, courts are left with Lemon, which is outdated and
not widely accepted on the Court, and Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, which appears to be
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newly constituted, is well positioned for a reorientation of its Establishment
230Clause jurisprudence back toward clarity and accommodation.
B. What the Supreme Court Should Do
To date, the Court has yet to address explicitly the scope of permissible
remedies of Establishment Clause violations. As shown, this silence has
caused inconsistency and confusion in the courtroom, forcing courts to adopt
ad hoc and overly fact-sensitive approaches to remedial questions. 231 A better
approach is desperately needed, and a few suggestions have been offered to fill
this void.
One commentator has posited a somewhat rigid test for the remedial
effectiveness of a land transfer.232 This proposal would require a remedial land
transfer to adhere to twin principles of substantial physical separation and strict
religious neutrality.233 In other words, it would tether its analysis to Justice
O'Connor's endorsement standard,234 requiring substantial separation between
religion and the state, or a reasonable appearance thereof.235 In this manner,
however, the proposal treads dangerously close to exhibiting hostility toward
religion.2 36  At the very least, the proposal limits remedial options only to
secular avenues because its requirement of strict neutrality prohibits any
religious involvement in fashioning a remedy.237 For these reasons, the Court
would be wise to look elsewhere.
heading toward a similar fate. See Marques, supra note 3 1, at 848 (implying that Van Orden and
McCreary County knocked the endorsement test from its pedestal as the preeminent
Establishment Clause test); discussion, supra Part I.B. 1.
230. See Marques, supra note 31, at 853 (hypothesizing that "recent changes in Supreme
Court membership could herald a return to clarity"). Although it is unclear how. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito will affect the Court's Establishment Clause approach, many
commentators believe the Court's two newest members will be sympathetic to religion and
religious groups. See Harwood, supra note 56, at 348-49; Marques, supra note 31, at 853-54.
231. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
232. See Budd, supra note 59, at 234-56.
233. Id. at 220.
234. See id. at 257.
235. See id. at 239-46 (asserting that physical separation requires both evident and
substantial separation).
236. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
237. See Budd, supra note 59, at 246 (asserting that "a remedial sale must accomplish that
objective through means that are strictly neutral with respect to the religious expression at issue").
Because every Establishment Clause violation necessarily involves some degree of religion, the
only effective "neutral" remedy under this proposal would be one in which the religious
component is removed, leaving the secular options as the only viable remedies. See McCreary
County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 889-93 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority
opinion's use of the neutrality principle and stating "[i]f religion in the public forum had to be
entirely nondenominational, there could be no religion in the public forum at all").
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A better approach, as advocated by one commentator, advances a five-238
pronged test to examine an Establishment Clause remedy. Splicing the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning with previous Supreme Court rationale, the end
result is a well-intentioned and seemingly effective mechanism. In application,
however, the modifications may prove unnecessary. Any thorough judicial
inquiry into a remedial land transfer should examine the substance and the
form of the transaction, as well as its purpose and consequences. Yet this five-
prong proposal limits a court's analysis to five specifically delineated criteria,
and in so doing, risks diminishing judicial diligence for the sake of judicial
clarity. In this way, it sacrifices a comprehensive remedial inquiry in favor of
a cookie-cutter analysis. Although such uniformity is a worthy goal, in the
context of a remedial land transfer inquiry, this proposal gives up too much in
return for far too little.
Instead, the Supreme Court should adopt the position that a transfer of
property is a presumptively effective remedy to an Establishment Clause
violation. The Court's jurisprudence would benefit from this presumption in
three ways: (1) it would adhere to the original intent of the Establishment
Clause and remain faithful to the current direction of the law; (2) it would
allow municipalities and local governments the flexibility to remedy
Establishment Clause violations with creative solutions, and not tie them down
with take-it-or-leave-it choices; and (3) it would respect the Free Exercise,
Free Speech, and property rights of private parties that acquire the land through
valid means.
1. Original Intent and Current Direction of the Law
The Establishment Clause, as proposed by the First Congress back in 1789,
only prohibited a state's establishment of a religion or an excessive
involvement in religion. 24  As was understood at the time, and as has been
pointed out in several Supreme Court opinions, religion had a significant place
in the then-existing American society. It was not until the last half of the
238. See Lauderman, supra note 11, at 1230-3 1. This proposal adopts three of the Seventh
Circuit's suggested "unusual circumstances"--the substance and form of the transaction, the
transfer's compliance with state laws, and the transfer's appraisal at fair market value-as the
test's first three prongs. Id. (citing Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield,
203 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2000)). The fourth prong of the analysis is a limited inquiry into the
stated purposes of the transaction, and, as the fifth prong, a review of the private speech rights
affected by the transaction. Id.
239. See id.
240. See GARRY, supra note 34, at 94 (explaining the Eighteenth Century understanding of
the establishment of religion). Examples of the establishment of religion during the founding era
included efforts to interfere with church affairs and efforts to provide preferential treatment to
certain sects. Buck, supra note 9, at 402, 404-05.
241. See generally GARRY, supra note 34, at 87-94. Professor Garry details the relationship
between religion and government in the United States, starting with the nation's settlement as a
refuge for those seeking religious freedom. Id. at 87. Early governments readily accepted the
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twentieth century that the role of religion in society came into question.
242
Even today, though, as religion has been mostly removed from the public
243sphere, remnants of its past role still remain. Some members of the Court
have appeared willing to work from this base toward a more conciliatory view
of religion, one in which government and religion can coexist through
accommodation.
24 4
Adopting the Seventh Circuit's holding would allow the Court to
accommodate a religious display in a manner consistent with the original intent
of the Establishment Clause as described by James Madison. 245 Absent any
unusual circumstances, a land transfer would necessarily divest the
government of any religious endorsement while also preserving the private
religious display. In this way, a transfer would be a device for the government
to yield back to the community a religious display that members of the
community had erected and maintained, and in which they still had an
interest. 246  Such a land transfer would represent a compromise between
secularism and religion, through which a long-standing religious display could
remain by severing the governmental ties to its religious message. Thus, it
would present a more workable balance in American society between
role of religion in society by donating land for churches, outlawing blasphemy and sacrilege, and
funding chaplains to offer daily prayers. Id. at 91-92. In fact, shortly after Congress proposed
the Establishment Clause, it also urged President George Washington to proclaim a national day
of public thanksgiving and prayer. Buck, supra note 9, at 408. The Supreme Court has variously
discussed this issue. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 886-87 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (outlining the early relationship between government and religion to conclude:
"[t]hose who wrote the Constitution believed that morality was essential to the well-being of
society and that encouragement of religion was the best way to foster morality"); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983) (stating that some religious acts, such as beginning a
legislative session with prayer, are "deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this
country").
242. See GARRY, supra note 34, at 105-06.
243. See GARRY, supra note 34, at 104-05 (noting "[m]any signs of America's historical
religious identity survive today," including witnesses in court swearing on the Bible, Supreme
Court and congressional sessions beginning with religious references, and the Pledge of
Allegiance's appeal to "one nation under God").
244. See Harwood, supra note 56, at 340-42. Harwood suggests that Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas adhere to the accommodation principle, as shown by their plurality in Van
Orden. Id. at 341-42. He suggests that the appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito will further strengthen the accommodation tendencies of the Court, giving it a five-justice
majority. Id at 350.
245. See discussion supra note 30.
246. For instance, in Buono, the proposed land transfer would have yielded the land on which
the Sunrise Cross sits to the VFW, which had originally erected the cross in 1934. Buono v.
Kempthome (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir.
2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v. Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-
472). Likewise, the transfer in Mercier yielded the land on which the Ten Commandments
monument sat to the Fraternal Order of Eagles, which had originally installed the monument in
1964. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693,694-97 (7th Cir. 2005).
Catholic University Law Review
government and religion, a goal toward which the Supreme Court has been
struggling unsuccessfully for over two centuries.247
2. Flexibility to Local Governments
Adopting the Seventh Circuit's holding would also provide local
governments with important flexibility with which to address major policy
issues. For municipalities today, the complexities of governance are increasing
as Americans become more religiously and culturally diverse. 248 This trend is
perhaps most volatile with issues of religious policy.249 As Buono, Mercier,
and Marshfield demonstrate, questions of religious displays can generate a
tremendous amount of emotion on both sides. 25  The government, as both the
arbiter of the dispute and as a main participant, is stuck in a difficult
predicament in choosing between the religious and the secular.25' Especially
under a current jurisprudence that sacrifices clarity in favor of dissonance, a
government can never have complete faith in the effectiveness of a particular
remedy.252 Often, the only option open to the government is a yes-or-no, take-
it-or-leave-it approach to the religious display.253 The government is thus
247. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that
"this Court's precedent permits even the slightest public recognition of religion to constitute an
establishment of religion").
248. See Joseph P. Viteritti, Reading Zelman: The Triumph of Pluralism, and Its Effects on
Liberty, Equality, and Choice, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1170-71 (2003) (noting the tension
between liberty and equality in public education as a result of increased secularism and pluralism
in America).
249. See Rosen, supra note 227, at 675 (suggesting that the relationship between religion and
the government has risen to become "political and cultural wars" regarding the scope of Judeo-
Christian values in public life (internal quotation marks omitted)).
250. See, e.g., Lake, supra note 13 (reporting that Buono claimed that the presence of the
cross offended him because he viewed it as an endorsement of religion by the government).
Local residents, however, vigorously supported the cross and resisted efforts to remove it. As
Henry Sandoz, the current caretaker of the cross, explained, "We didn't just tell them no. We
said, 'Hell no."' Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
251. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 767-68 (1995)
(plurality opinion) (explaining that when a government's endorsement is imputed to a private
party via the "transferred endorsement" principle, "[p]olicymakers would find themselves in a
vise between the Establishment Clause," which may forbid a certain religious display, "and the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, which may protect it"). At least one commentator has
posited that judicial deference to state decision-making would reduce the scope of litigation over
public religious displays by making the political process the ultimate arbiter. See Smith, supra
note 229, at 133-34. Smith also notes that since McCreary County and Van Orden lower courts
appear to be adopting such a deferential position in Establishment Clause cases. Id. at 133.
252. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 870-73 (2005) (rejecting attempts
by the county governments to remedy Establishment Clause violations by proffering new
purposes and adding additional "foundational" documents).
253. See Budd, supra note 59, at 223 (arguing that the only viable remedy for an intrinsically
religious display "is to physically separate government from the unconstitutional display"). Budd
notes that physical separation may be achieved by removing the display or privatizing the land on
which the display sits. Id. He argues that a sale of land necessarily requires a stricter scrutiny
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forced into a Sophie's Choice situation in which, quite simply, it cannot win.
If it retains the display, the government runs the risk of facing a lawsuit. If it
removes the display, it faces a backlash from the community entity that erected
and maintained the display.
254
The Seventh Circuit's position, however, allows the government the
flexibility to both preserve the display and avoid the constitutional violation.
A presumption of effectiveness absent unusual circumstances allows the
government to remedy a violation by selling the land as easily as it would by
removing the display. It incorporates a principle of deference that rightly
passes the decision-making authority from the courts to the political process.
At the very least, it calms an overly-sensitive judicial inquiry into the validity
of the land transfer. It thus affords the government a degree of latitude within
which to develop solutions that cure an Establishment Clause violation without
forcing the display to be removed. This flexibility permits the government-
whether local, state, or federal-to adopt a remedial approach that best
comports with its unique history, traditions, public opinion, and way of life. 5
In short, this approach recognizes that in the realm of remedial Establishment
Clause analyses, one size does not always fit all.
3. Respect for the Rights of Private Party Purchasers
Finally, the position of the Seventh Circuit suitably appreciates the rights of
a private party in contracting for the land containing the religious speech.
Various Supreme Court justices have recognized a fundamental difference
between government-sponsored speech endorsing religion and private speech
espousing religion.256 They have opined that the Free Exercise and Free
Speech Clauses protect a private endorsement of religion, whether or not the
private speech may be mistaken for government speech.2 57 Thus, the salient
factor, at least with respect to whether a religious display may be remedied, is
and more thorough analysis because "the remedy is potentially a mere recharacterization of title
with little or no substantive effect on the perception of government endorsement." See id. at 233.
His remedial analysis, however, presupposes the use of the endorsement standard. Id. at 215-16,
233. This test, however, may not be received favorably by the current Supreme Court. See supra
note 230 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 250.
255. Cf Rosen, supra note 227, at 695, 701 (arguing for an approach known as "sizing,"
whereby constitutional constraints would apply differently to different levels of government).
256. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 765-66 (plurality opinion) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)).
257. See id. at 766 ("Petitioners assert ... the distinction [between private speech and
government speech] disappears whenever private speech can be mistaken for government speech.
That proposition cannot be accepted, at least where, as here, the government has not fostered or
encouraged the mistake.").
Catholic University Law Review
the actual ownership of the parcel in question. 258 A land transfer, once it
divests the government's control from the parcel, transforms the religious
259message into purely private speech. Once the land is privately owned, the
proper analysis must shift from the Establishment Clause to the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses. The Seventh Circuit's position understands this
shift, and it correctly protects the rights of the private party.26 ° Its presumption
of effectiveness errs on the side of the private religious expression by imputing
a public character to a private party only with a showing of unusual
circumstances. 261  The burden, therefore, is on the party challenging the
display to show the private speech is actually governmentally endorsed.
Moreover, in adopting its presumption, the Seventh Circuit demonstrated an
appreciation for the rights a private party has in his property.262 It permits the
purchaser to accept only the rights and obligations he expected to receive when
he contracted for the property. His purchase, absent unusual circumstances, is
not tainted by any government endorsement that may have occurred prior to
his ownership. The presumption secures the party's expectation interest in
utilizing his property according to his wishes.
For the reasons explained, the Supreme Court should adopt the Seventh
Circuit's presumption that the transfer of land is an effective remedy to an
Establishment Clause violation. Of course, the party challenging the transfer
may rebut the presumption, but only with a demonstration of unusual
circumstances does the presumption break down. The Seventh Circuit's
position advances the original intent of the Establishment Clause, grants
greater flexibility to governments, and protects the rights of private purchasers.
Most importantly, by adopting the position of the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme
Court could advance its Establishment Clause jurisprudence toward clarity and
common sense. After two hundred years of inconsistency, this advancement is
sorely needed.
258. See Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir.
2000) ("Because of the difference in the way we treat private speech and public speech, the
determination of whom we should impute speech onto is critical.").
259. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 767 (plurality opinion) (noting that the Establishment Clause
was never intended to impede purely private religious speech).
260. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497 ("[E]ither the Fund, a private land owner, must be
estopped from exercising its right to free exercise and freedom of speech on its own property, or
some way must be found to differentiate between property owned by the Fund and property
owned by the City. The latter-not the former-is the appropriate solution."); see also Buono v.
Kempthome (Buono V), 527 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Salazar v.
Buono, 77 U.S.L.W. 3243 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2009) (No. 08-472) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from
the denial of rehearing en banc) ("The Seventh Circuit properly applied the principle that once
publicly-owned land is transferred to a private party, government action ceases, and the
Establishment Clause violation necessarily goes with it.").
261. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 491, 495.
262. See Buono V, 527 F.3d at 764 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc) (explaining that "the Seventh Circuit correctly held that a private party's rights may not
be brushed aside to remedy the government's violative conduct").
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IV. CONCLUSION
Over the last two-hundred-plus years, the Establishment Clause has grown
from a superfluous afterthought to a disjointed and dissonant doctrine. Today,
its fractured jurisprudence lends little assistance to courts in determining
whether there is an Establishment Clause violation, and, if so, how to
effectively remedy it. This discord is highlighted by three cases in two
circuits, Salazar v. Buono from the Ninth Circuit and Freedom from Religion
Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield and Mercier v. Fraternal Order of
Eagles in the Seventh Circuit. These cases have come to different conclusions
on the same question: whether a transfer of public land to a private party is an
effective remedy to an Establishment Clause violation. The Ninth Circuit held
that such a transfer is not an effective remedy; the Seventh Circuit held that it
is. In comparing the two rationales, the Seventh Circuit's case law helps to
elucidate how the Ninth Circuit misapplies Supreme Court doctrine and
ignores precedent. The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, adopts an approach that
remains faithful to the original intent of the Establishment Clause, provides
greater flexibility for remedial decisions, and protects the rights of private
parties. As the Supreme Court moves forward, it would be well advised to
adopt the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and hold that a transfer of public
property to a private party is a presumptively effective remedy to an
Establishment Clause violation.
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